Abstract. We present a compositional verification technique for systems that exhibit both probabilistic and nondeterministic behaviour. We adopt an assume-guarantee approach to verification, where both the assumptions made about system components and the guarantees that they provide are regular safety properties, represented by finite automata. Unlike previous proposals for assume-guarantee reasoning about probabilistic systems, our approach does not require that components interact in a fully synchronous fashion. In addition, the compositional verification method is efficient and fully automated, based on a reduction to the problem of multi-objective probabilistic model checking. We present asymmetric and circular assume-guarantee rules, and show how they can be adapted to form quantitative queries, yielding lower and upper bounds on the actual probabilities that a property is satisfied. Our techniques have been implemented and applied to several large case studies, including instances where conventional probabilistic verification is infeasible.
Introduction
Many computerised systems exhibit probabilistic behaviour, for example due to the use of randomisation (e.g. in distributed communication or security protocols), or the presence of failures (e.g. in faulty devices or unreliable communication media). The prevalence of such systems in today's society makes techniques for their formal verification a necessity. This requires models and formalisms that incorporate both probability and nondeterminism. Although efficient algorithms for verifying such models are known [2, 7] and mature tool support [11, 6] exists, applying these techniques to large, real-life systems remains challenging, and hence techniques to improve scalability are essential.
In this paper, we focus on compositional verification techniques for probabilistic and nondeterministic systems, in which a system comprising multiple interacting components can be verified by analysing each component in isolation, rather than verifying the much larger model of the whole system. In the case of non-probabilistic models, a successful approach is the use of assume-guarantee reasoning. This is based on checking queries of the form A M G , with the meaning "whenever component M is part of a system satisfying the assumption A, then the system is guaranteed to satisfy property G". Proof rules can then be established that show, for example, that if true M 1 A (process M 1 satisfies assumption A in any environment) and A M 2 G hold, then the combined system M 1 M 2 satisfies G. For probabilistic systems, compositional approaches have also been studied, but a distinct lack of practical progress has been made. In this paper, we address this limitation, presenting the first fully-automated technique for compositional verification of systems exhibiting both probabilistic and nondeterministic behaviour, and illustrating its applicability and efficiency on several large case studies.
We use probabilistic automata [20, 21] , a well-studied formalism that is naturally suited to modelling multi-component probabilistic systems. Indeed, elegant proof techniques have been developed and used to manually prove correctness of large, complex randomised algorithms [18] . Several branching-time preorders (simulation and bisimulation) have been proposed for probabilistic automata and have been shown to be compositional (i.e. preserved under parallel composition) [21] , but such branching-time equivalences are often too fine to give significant practical advantages for compositional verification.
A coarser linear-time preorder can be obtained through trace distribution (probability distributions over sequences of observable actions) inclusion [20] ; however, it is well known that this relation is not preserved under parallel composition [19] . Various attempts have been made to characterise refinement relations that are preserved, e.g. [20, 15] . An alternative direction is to restrict the forms of parallel composition that are allowed. One example is the formalism of switched probabilistic I/O automata [5] , which places restrictions on the scheduling between parallel components. Another is [8] which uses a probabilistic extension of Reactive Modules, restricted to synchronous parallel composition. A limitation of all these approaches is that the relations used, such as trace distribution inclusion and weak probabilistic simulation, are not efficiently computable.
We propose an assume-guarantee verification technique for probabilistic automata, that has no restrictions on the parallel composition permitted between components, allowing greater flexibility to model complex systems. To achieve this, we represent both the assumptions made about system components and the guarantees that they provide as safety properties. In the context of probabilistic systems, safety properties capture a wide range of useful properties, e.g. "the maximum probability of an error occurring is at most 0.01" or "the minimum probability of terminating within k time-units is at least 0.75".
We represent safety properties using finite automata and show that verifying assume-guarantee queries reduces to the problem of multi-objective model checking for probabilistic automata [10] , which can be implemented efficiently using linear programming. Another key benefit of using finite automata in this way is illustrated by the (non-probabilistic) assume-guarantee verification framework of [16] . There, not only is the verification of queries fully automated, but the assumptions themselves (represented as finite automata) are generated automatically using learning techniques. This opens the way for applying learning techniques to compositional verification in the probabilistic case.
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We use our definitions of probabilistic assume guarantee reasoning to formulate and prove several assume-guarantee proof rules, representing commonly occurring patterns of processes. We also discuss how to employ quantitative reasoning, in particular obtaining lower and upper bounds on the actual probability that a system satisfies a safety property. The techniques have been implemented in a prototype tool and applied to several large case studies. We demonstrate significant speed-ups over traditional, non-compositional verification, and successfully verify models that cannot be analysed without compositional techniques.
A full version of this paper, including additional proofs, is available as [12] .
Related work. In addition to the compositional techniques for probabilistic systems surveyed above [5, 8, 15, [18] [19] [20] [21] , we mention several other related pieces of work. In particular, our approach was inspired by the large body of work by Giannakopoulou, Pasareanu et al. (see e.g. [16] ) on non-probabilistic assume guarantee techniques. We also build upon ideas put forward in [10] , which suggests using multi-objective verification to check probabilistic assume-guarantee queries. Also relevant are: [9] , which presents an assume/guarantee framework using probabilistic contracts for non-probabilistic models; [3] , which presents a theoretical framework for compositional verification of quantitative (but not probabilistic) properties; and [17] , which uses probabilistic automata to model the environment of non-probabilistic components.
Background
We begin by briefly reviewing probabilistic automata and techniques for their verification. We also introduce safety properties, in the context of probabilistic systems, and discuss multi-objective model checking.
In the following, we use Dist(S) to denote the set of all discrete probability distributions over a set S, η s for the point distribution on s ∈ S, and µ 1 ×µ 2 ∈ Dist(S 1 ×S 2 ) for the product distribution of µ 1 ∈ Dist(S 1 ) and µ 2 ∈ Dist(S 2 ).
Probabilistic automata
Probabilistic automata [20, 21] are a modelling formalism for systems that exhibit both probabilistic and nondeterministic behaviour.
AP is a labelling function, assigning atomic propositions from a set AP to each state.
In any state s of a PA M , a transition, denoted s a − → µ, where a is an action label and µ is a discrete probability distribution over states, is available 1 if (s, a, µ) ∈ δ M . In an execution of the model, the choice between the available transitions in each state is nondeterministic; the choice of successor state is then made randomly according to the distribution µ. A path through M is a (finite or infinite) sequence s 0 a0,µ0
−−−→ · · · where s 0 = s and, for each i 0, s i ai − → µ i is a transition and µ i (s i+1 ) > 0. The sequence of actions a 0 , a 1 , . . . , after removal of any "internal actions" τ , from a path π is called a trace and is denoted tr(π).
To reason about PAs, we use the notion of adversaries (also called schedulers or strategies), which resolve the nondeterministic choices in a model, based on its execution history. Formally an adversary σ maps any finite path to a sub-distribution over the available transitions in the last state of the path. Adversaries are defined in terms of sub-distributions because they can opt to (with some probability) take none of the available choices and remain in the current state. For this reason, they are are sometimes called partial adversaries. Occasionally, we will distinguish between these and complete adversaries, in which all the distributions are total.
We denote by Path σ M the set of all paths through M when controlled by adversary σ, and by Adv M the set of all possible adversaries for M . Under an adversary σ, we define a probability space Pr To reason about probabilistic systems comprising multiple components, we will need the notions of parallel composition and alphabet extension:
is defined such that (s 1 , s 2 ) a − → µ 1 ×µ 2 if and only if one of the following holds:
We also require the notion of projections. First, for any state s = (s 1 , s 2 ) of M 1 M 2 , the projection of s onto M i , denoted by s Mi , is s i . We extend this notation to distributions over the state space S 1 ×S 2 of M 1 M 2 in the standard manner. Next, for any path π of M 1 M 2 , the projection of π onto M i , denoted π Mi , is the path obtained from π by projecting each state of π onto M i and removing all the actions not in α Mi together with the subsequent states.
Definition 4 (Projections of adversaries).
Let M 1 and M 2 be PAs and σ an adversary of M 1 M 2 . The projection of σ onto M i , denoted σ Mi , is the adversary on M i where, for any finite path π of M i :
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Compositional reasoning about PAs, and in particular adversary projections, necessitates the use of partial, rather than complete, adversaries. In particular, even if an adversary σ of M 1 M 2 is complete, the projection σ Mi onto one component may be partial.
Model checking for PAs
The verification of PAs against properties specified either in temporal logic or as automata has been well studied. In this paper, both the states and transitions of PAs are labelled (with sets of atomic propositions and actions, respectively) and we formulate properties that refer to both types of labels. For the former, we will express properties in linear temporal logic (LTL), and for the latter, we will use safety properties represented by deterministic finite automata.
LTL verification. For an LTL formula ψ, PA M and adversary σ ∈ Adv M :
where π |= ψ denotes satisfaction according to the standard semantics of LTL. Verifying an LTL specification ψ against M typically involves checking that the probability of satisfying ψ meets a probability bound for all adversaries. This reduces to computing the minimum or maximum probability of satisfying ψ:
The complexity of this computation is polynomial in the size of M and doubly exponential in the size of ψ [7] . In practice, the LTL formula ψ is small and, for simple, commonly used cases such as ♦ap ("eventually ap") or ap ("globally ap"), model checking is polynomial [2] . Furthermore, efficient implementations of LTL verification exist in tools such as PRISM [11] and LiQuor [6] .
Safety properties. A regular safety property A represents a set of infinite words, denoted L(A), that is characterised by a regular language of bad prefixes, finite words of which any extension is not in L(A). More precisely, we will define a regular safety property A by a (complete) deterministic finite automaton (DFA)
Given a PA M , adversary σ ∈ Adv M and regular safety property A with α A ⊆ α M , we define the probability of M under σ satisfying A as:
where w α is the projection of word w onto a subset α of its alphabet. We then define Pr A probabilistic safety property A p comprises a regular safety property A and a rational probability bound p. We say that a PA M satisfies the property, denoted M |= A p , if the probability of satisfying A is at least p for any adversary:
Safety properties can be used to represent a wide range of useful properties of probabilistic automata. Examples include:
-"the probability of an error occurring is at most 0.01" -"event A always occurs before event B with probability at least 0.98" -"the probability of terminating within k time-units is at least 0.75"
The last of these represents a very useful class of properties for timed probabilistic systems, perhaps not typically considered as safety properties. Using the digital clocks approach of [13] , verifying real-time probabilistic systems can often be reduced to analysis of a PA with time steps encoded as a special action type. Such requirements are then naturally encoded as safety properties.
Example 1. Figure 1 shows two PAs M 1 and M 2 . Component M 1 represents a controller that powers down devices. Upon receipt of the detect signal, it first issues the warn signal followed by shutdown; however, with probability 0.2 it will fail to issue the warn signal. M 2 represents a device which, given the shutdown signal, powers down correctly if it first receives the warn signal and otherwise will only power down correctly 90% of the time. We consider a simple safety property G "action fail never occurs", represented by the DFA G err also shown in Figure 1 . Composing the two PAs in parallel and applying model checking, we have that Pr
Safety verification. Using standard automata-based techniques for model checking PAs [7] , verifying correctness of probabilistic safety properties reduces to model checking the product of a PA and a DFA:
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Proposition 1. For PA M and regular safety property A, we have:
Thus, using [2] , satisfaction of the probabilistic safety property A p can be checked in time polynomial in the size of M ⊗A err . Note that maximum reachability probabilities, and therefore satisfaction of probabilistic safety properties, are independent of whether complete or partial adversaries are considered.
Multi-objective model checking. In addition to traditional probabilistic model checking techniques, the approach presented in this paper requires the use of multi-objective model checking [10] . The conventional approach described above allows us to check whether, for all adversaries (or, dually, for at least one adversary), the probability of some property is above (or below) a given bound. Multi-objective queries allow us to check the existence of an adversary satisfying multiple properties of this form. In particular, consider k predicates of the form Pr σ M (ψ i ) ∼ i p i where ψ i is an LTL formula, p i ∈ [0, 1] is a rational probability bound and ∼ i ∈ { , >}. Using the techniques in [10] , we can verify whether:
by a reduction to a linear programming (LP) problem. Like for (single-objective) LTL verification, this can be done in time polynomial in the size of M (and doubly exponential in the sizes of ψ i ). In fact, [10] also shows that this technique generalises to checking existential or universal queries over a Boolean combination of predicates for which ∼ i ∈ { , >, , <}. In all cases, if an adversary which satisfies the predicates exists, then it can also easily be obtained.
Finally, through a trivial extension of this approach (and without increasing the complexity), we can formulate quantitative multi-objective queries. For example, given a conjunction of the above predicates
, and an additional LTL formula ψ 0 , we can compute the maximum probability of ψ 0 that is achievable whilst also satisfying Ψ :
Compositional Verification for PAs
We now describe our approach for compositional verification of probabilistic automata. We first define the basic underlying ideas and then present several different proof rules. For clarity, we present the simplest of these rules in some detail and then discuss some generalisations and extensions.
We extend the notion of assume-guarantee reasoning to PAs using probabilistic assume-guarantee triples of the form A p A M G p G , where A p A and
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G p G are probabilistic safety properties and M is a PA. Informally, the meaning of this is "whenever M is part of a system satisfying A with probability at least p A , then the system will satisfy G with probability at least p G ". Formally:
Definition 7 (Assume-guarantee semantics). If A p A and G p G are probabilistic safety properties, M is a PA and α G ⊆ α A ∪ α M , then
The use of M [α A ], i.e. M extended to the alphabet of A, in this definition is required for the case where the property G includes actions that are not in M .
We write true M G p G to denote the absence of any assumption, i.e. the query true M G p G is equivalent to M |= G p G which, as described above, is standard model checking [2] . In the general case, we check the satisfaction of a probabilistic assume-guarantee triple using multi-objective PA model checking: 
which can be checked in time polynomial in |M | by solving an LP problem [10] .
We now present, using the definitions above, several assume-guarantee proof rules to allow compositional verification.
An asymmetric proof rule. The first rule we consider is asymmetric, in the sense that we require only a single assumption about one component. Experience in the non-probabilistic setting [16] indicates that, despite its simplicity, rules of this form are widely applicable. Theorem 1. If M 1 , M 2 are probabilistic automata and A p A , G p G probabilistic safety properties such that α A ⊆ α M1 and α G ⊆ α M2 ∪ α A , then the following proof rule holds:
Theorem 1 means that, given an appropriate assumption A p A , we can check the correctness of a probabilistic safety property G p G on M 1 M 2 , without constructing and model checking the full model. Instead, we perform one instance of (standard) model checking on M 1 (to check the first condition of rule (ASym)) and one instance of multi-objective model checking on M 2 [α A ]⊗A err (to check the second). If A err is much smaller than M 1 , we can expect significant gains in terms of the verification performance. Example 2. We illustrate the rule (ASym) on the PAs M 1 , M 2 and property G 0.98 from Example 1. Figure 2 (left) shows a DFA A err representing the safety property A "warn occurs before shutdown". We will use the probabilistic safety property A 0.8 as the assumption about M 1 in (ASym).
Checking the first condition of (ASym) amounts to verifying M 1 |= A 0.8 , which can be done with standard probabilistic model checking. To complete the verification, we need to check the second condition A 0.8 M 2 G 0.98 , which, from Proposition 2, is achieved though multi-objective model checking on the product 2 M 2 ⊗A err ⊗G err . More precisely, we check there is no adversary under which the probability of remaining within states not satisfying err A is at least 0.8 and the probability of reaching an err G state is above 1−0.98 = 0.02. The product is shown in Figure 2 (right), where we indicate states satisfying err A and err G by highlighting the accepting states a 2 and q 1 of DFAs A err and G err . By inspection, we see that no such adversary exists, so we can conclude that M 1 M 2 |= G 0.98 . Consider, however, the adversary σ which, in the initial state, chooses warn with probability 0.8 and shutdown with probability 0.2. This satisfies ¬err A with probability 0.8 and ♦err G with probability 0.02. Hence, 
Proof (of Theorem 1). The proof is by contradiction. Assume that there exist PAs M 1 and M 2 and probabilistic safety properties A p A and
From the latter, it follows that there exists an adversary σ ∈ Adv M1 M2 such that Pr σ M1 M2 (G) < p G . Now, since true M 1 A p A and σ M1 ∈ Adv M1 , it follows that:
which contradicts the assumption that Pr
Generalising the proof rule. Next, we state two useful generalisations of the above proof rule. First, using A 1 , . . . , A k p1,...,p k to denote the conjunction of probabilistic safety properties A i pi for i = 1, . . . , k, we have:
Definition 7 extends naturally to k assumptions, replacing α A with ∪ k i=1 α Ai and the single probabilistic safety property on the left-hand side of the implication with the conjunction. In similar fashion, by adapting Proposition 2, model checking of the query
err . Secondly, we observe that, through repeated application of (ASym), we obtain a rule of the following form for n components:
A circular proof rule. One potential limitation of the rule (Asym) is that we may not be able to show that the assumption A 1 about M 1 holds without making additional assumptions about M 2 . This can be overcome by using the following circular proof rule:
, then the following circular assume-guarantee proof rule holds:
An asynchronous proof rule. This rule is motivated by the fact that, often, part of a system comprises several asynchronous components, that is, components with disjoint alphabets. In such cases, it can be difficult to establish useful probability bounds on the combined system if the fact that the components act independently is ignored. For example, consider the case of n independent coin flips; in isolation, we have that the probability of any coin not returning a tail is 1/2. Now, ignoring the independence of the coins, all we can say is that the probability of any of them not returning a tail is at least 1/2. However, using their independence, we have that this probability is at least 1−1/2 n .
Theorem 3. For any PAs M 1 , M 2 and probabilistic safety properties
and α G2 ⊆ α M2 ∪ α A2 , we have the following asynchronous assume-guarantee proof rule:
where the disjunction of safety properties G 1 and G 2 is obtained by taking the intersection of the DFAs G 
Quantitative Assume-Guarantee Queries
Practical experience with probabilistic verification suggests that it is often more useful to adopt a quantitative approach. For example, rather than checking the correctness of a probabilistic safety property G p G , it may be preferable to just compute the actual worst-case (minimum) probability Pr min M (G) that G is satisfied. In this section we consider how to formulate such quantitative queries in the context of assume-guarantee reasoning. For simplicity, we restrict our attention here to the rule (ASym) for fixed PAs M 1 and M 2 , and property G. Similar reasoning applies to the other rules presented above.
Maximal lower bounds. Rule (ASym) allows us to establish lower bounds for the probability Pr min M1 M2 (G), i.e. it can be used to prove, for certain values of
We consider now how to obtain the highest such lower bound, say p G . First, we note that, from Definition 7, it is clear that the highest value of p G for which A p A M 2 G p G holds will be obtained by using the maximum possible value of p A . For rule (ASym) to be applicable, this is equal to Pr min M1 (A), since for any higher value of p A the first condition will fail to hold. Now, by Proposition 2, and letting M = M 2 [α A ] ⊗ A err ⊗ G err , the value p G can be obtained through multi-objective model checking as follows:
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Parameterised queries. Let us assume that component M 1 is parameterised by a variable x in such a way that varying x changes the probability of M 1 satisfying the assumption A. For example, increasing the value of x might increase the probability Pr M1 (A), but simultaneously worsen some other performance measure or cost associated with M 1 . In this situation, it is desirable to establish a trade-off between the probability of M 1 M 2 satisfying G and the secondary 'cost' of M 1 . Our use of multi-objective model checking for compositional verification offers two choices here. Firstly, we can pick a suitable threshold for Pr M1 M2 (G) and then compute the lowest value of Pr M1 (A) which guarantees this, allowing an appropriate value of x to be chosen. Alternatively, we can consider the so-called Pareto curve: the set of achievable combinations of Pr M1 M2 (G) and Pr M1 (A), which will present a clear view of the trade-off. For the latter, we can use the techniques of [10] for approximate exploration of the Pareto curve.
Upper bounds. Since application of (ASym) gives lower bounds on Pr min M1 M2 (G), it is desirable to also generate upper bounds on this probability. This can be done as follows. When checking condition 2 of (ASym), using multi-objective model checking, we also obtain an adversary σ ∈ Adv M2[α A ]⊗A err that satisfies A p A and gives the minimum (i.e. worst-case) probability of satisfying G. This can then be projected onto M 2 , giving an adversary σ 2 which achieves the worstcase behaviour of the single component M 2 with respect to G satisfying A p A . Furthermore, from σ 2 , we can easily construct a PA M σ2 2 that represents the behaviour of M 2 under σ 2 .
Finally, we compute the probability of satisfying
is likely to be much smaller than M 2 , there is scope for this to be efficient, even if model checking M 1 M 2 in full is not feasible. Since M 1 M σ2 2 represents only a subset of the behaviour of M 1 M 2 , the probability computed is guaranteed to give an upper bound on Pr min M1 M2 (G). We use σ 2 (which achieves the worst-case behaviour with respect to G), rather than an arbitrary adversary of M 2 , in order to obtain a tighter upper bound.
Implementation and Case Studies
We have implemented our compositional verification approach in a prototype tool. Recall that, using the rules given in Section 3, verification requires both standard (automata-based) model checking and multi-objective model checking. Our tool is based on the probabilistic model checker PRISM [11] , which already supports LTL model checking of probabilistic automata. Model checking of probabilistic safety properties, represented by DFAs, can be achieved with existing versions of PRISM, since DFAs can easily be encoded in PRISM's modelling language. For multi-objective model checking, we have extended PRISM with an implementation of the techniques in [10] . This requires the solution of Linear Programming (LP) problems, for which we use the ECLiPSe Constraint Logic Programming system with the COIN-OR CBC solver, implementing a branchand-cut algorithm. All experiments were run on a 2GHz PC with 2GB RAM. Any run exceeding a time-limit of 24 hours was disregarded.
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We demonstrate the application of our tool to two large case studies. The first is the randomised consensus algorithm of Aspnes & Herlihy [1] . The algorithm allows N processes in a distributed network to reach a consensus and employs, in each round, a shared coin protocol parameterised by K. The PA model is based on [14] and consists of an automaton for each process and for the shared coin protocol of each round. We analyse the minimum probability that the processes decide by round R. The compositional verification employs R−2 uses of the Async rule to return a probabilistic safety property satisfied by the (asynchronous) composition of the shared coin protocols for the first R−2 rounds. This is then used as the assumption of an Asym rule for the subsystem representing the processes.
The second case study is the Zeroconf network configuration protocol [4] . We use the PA model from [13] consisting of two components, one representing a new host joining the network (parameterised by K, the number of probes it sends before using an IP address), and the second representing the environment, i.e. the existing network. We consider two properties: the minimum probability that a host employs a fresh IP address and that a host is configured by time T . In each case the compositional verification uses one application of the Circ rule. Table 1 shows experimental results for these case studies. We present the total time required for both compositional verification, as described in this paper, and non-compositional verification using PRISM (with the fastest available engine). Note that, in each case, we use the quantitative approach described in Section 4 and give actual (bounds on) probabilities computed. To give an indication of the size of the models considered, we give the number of states for the full (noncompositional) models and the number of variables in the LP problems used for multi-objective model checking in the compositional case.
In summary, we see that the compositional approach is faster in the majority of cases. Furthermore, it allows verification of several models for which it is infeasible with conventional techniques. For the cases where compositional verification is slower, this is due to the cost of solving a large LP problem, which is known to be more expensive than the highly optimised techniques used in PRISM. Furthermore, LP solution represents the limiting factor with respect to the scalability of the compositional approach. We expect that improvements to our technique can be made that will reduce LP problem sizes and improve performance. Finally, we note that the numerical values produced using compositional verification are generally good; in fact, for the consensus case study, the bounds obtained are precise.
Conclusions
We have presented a compositional verification technique, based on assumeguarantee rules, for probabilistic automata. Properties of these models are represented as probabilistic safety properties, and we show how verifying the resulting assume-guarantee queries reduces to the problem of multi-objective model checking. We also show how this can be leveraged to provide a quantitative ap-
